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INTRODUCTION

Minnesota has recently enacted a trademark dilution statute
which provides injunctive relief for the misuse of trademarks or
trade names which are "well known or famous."' This article
will briefly trace the history of trademark dilution, the pertinent

case law, Congress' actions pertaining to dilution and the brief
legislative history of the Minnesota statute. An analysis will
conclude with a suggested framework for the determination of
whether a mark is "well known or famous" pursuant to the
Minnesota statute.
t Associate with the firm of Merchant, Gould, Smith, Edell, Welter & Schmidt.
1. MINN. STAT. § 325D.165 (1994). This statute states that:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark or trade name shall be grounds for injunctive relief,
regardless of the presence or the absence of competition between the parties
or likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception. For the purpose of this
section, the following terms have the meanings given them: (1) "dilution"
means the lessening of the capacity of an owner's mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services; and (2) "distinctive quality" means the mark is
inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness, and the mark is well
known or famous.
Id.
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HISTORY OF TRADEMARK DILUTION

Under federal trademark law, actionable misuse of a
trademark requires confusion, or a likelihood of confusion
between the complained of mark and the plaintiff's mark.2 The
federal courts have identified factors which must be considered
in an analysis of trademark infringement.' There is no single
controlling factor; rather multiple factors must be considered.4
These factors include the strength of the infringed mark, the
similarity of the marks examined as a whole, the degree to which
the products compete with one another, the intent of the alleged
infringer to pass off its goods as the product of another,
evidence of actual confusion, and whether the kind of product
and its costs and conditions of purchase would allow a purchaser
to eliminate the likelihood of confusion which would otherwise
exist.5 Thus under traditional trademark law, actual confusion
or a likelihood of confusion must exist in order for a trademark
holder to successfully enforce its rights.
The element of confusion is the critical difference between
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and traditional
trademark dilution. Confusion is not necessary under traditional
Although protection of one's
trademark dilution theory.'
property rights in a mark is a common objective of both

2. Federal Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988); LanhamAct, 15 U.S.C. § 1125
(1988). The Supreme Court has identified likelihood of confusion as follows: "[U]nder
the Lanham Act, the ultimate test is whether the public is likely to be deceived or
confused by the similarity of the marks.... Whether we call the violation infringement,
unfair competition or false designation of origin, the test is identical-is there a
'likelihood of confusion?'" Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2763,
23 U.S.P.Q. 2d, 1081, 1088 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting New West Corp.
v. NYM Co. of California, Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201, 202 U.S.P.Q. 2d 643, 649 (9th Cir.
1979) (footnote omitted).
3. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)
(listing as relevant factors the strength of the trademark, the degree of similarity,
proximity of the products to one another, the likelihood any gap may be bridged, actual
confusion, and the sophistication of buyers), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); Squirtco
v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (listing as relevant factors the
likelihood of confusion, the strength of an existing mark, degree of similarity,
proximity, intent to infringe, and actual confusion).
4. Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495.
5. Squirtco, 628 F.2d at 1091.
6. See MINN. STAT. § 325D.165 (1994). The statute allows a cause of action
regardless of "the presence or the absence of... likelihood of confusion, mistake or
deception." Id.
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traditional trademark infringement law and trademark dilution
law, the two differ significantly in analysis.
Although it is difficult to pinpoint, trademark dilution may
have originated in England when, in 1890, an English court
protected the trademark "Kodak" against use on bicycles.7
Frank Schechter, in a Harvard Law Review article published in
1927, is credited as one of the first to recognize and analyze
trademark dilution as a remedy.' Schechter was disturbed by
the "trademark pirates" becoming more sophisticated and not
copying the exact products, but rather using famous trademarks
on different goods.' The focus of Schechter's article was on
unrelated, noncompeting uses of distinctive, famous trademarks
or trade names.1 0 Schechter's position was that the advertising
power of the trademark was its primary value." With this in
mind, Schechter postulated that unauthorized uses of a strong
mark tend to diminish the public's association with the mark,
which results in a "whittling away" or a "dispersion" of the
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by

7. See, e.g., Walter L Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the AntiDilution Statutes, 44 CAL. L. REV. 439, 448 n.48 (1956) (citing Eastman Photographic
Materials Co. v.John Griffith Corp., 15 Pat. Cas. 105, 112 (1898)).
8. Frank I. Schechter, The RationalBasis of TrademarkProtection, 40 HARv. L. REV.
813 (1927), 22 TRADEMARK BULL. 139 (1927), reprinted in 60 TRADEMARK REP. 334
(1970). There have been numerous scholarly articles on trademark dilution since the
Schechter article. See, e.g., David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining TrademarkDilution, 44 VAND.
L. REv. 531 (1991); HowardJ. Shire, Dilution Versus Deception-Are State Antidilution Laws
an Appropriate Alternative to the Law of Infringement, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 273 (1987);
Milton W. Handlor, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the NationalProtection
of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269 (1985);Jerre B. Swann, et al., Dilution, An Idea
Whose Time Has Gone; Brand Equity as Protectible Property, The New/Old Paradigm, 84
TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1994); Richard A. De Sevo, Antidilution Laws: The Unresolved
Dilemma of Preemption Under the Lanham Act, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 300 (1994); Richard
Taylor, Texas'New TrademarkAntidilution Statute-Useful or Useless New Protectionfor Texas
Trademarks?,21 ST. MARY'S LJ. 1019 (1990); Note, Infringement or Will-O-Wsp?, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 520, 530 (1964).
9. Schechter, supra note 8, at 825.
10. Schechter remarked in Congressional hearings:
I think there is not only the question of deception of the public, but I believe
... the person who has the trade-mark should be able to prevent other people
from vitiating the originality, the uniqueness of that mark. If you take Rolls
Royce-for instance, if you allow Rolls Royce restaurants and Rolls Royce
cafeterias, and Rolls Royce pants, and Rolls Royce candy, in 10 years you will
not have the Rolls Royce mark anymore. That is the point.
HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1932) (testimony of
Frank Schechter) (quoted in Derenberg, supra note 7, at 449).
11. Schechter, supra note 8, at 817-19.
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2
its use on non-competing goods.'
It is not surprising trademark dilution is a relatively recent
addition to the state statutes as compared to traditional trademark infringement."3
The relatively recent explosion and
expansion of the power of the media allows a corporation to
create trademarks which are recognized worldwide. 4 This
ability to expose one's trademark to millions of people creates
a climate in which famous trademarks, which were once limited
to trademarks such as Ford and Kodak, may be created almost
overnight through the use of creative marketing, advertising
dollars, and widespread dissemination by the media.
Although most trademark dilution legislation does not
identify specific types of dilution, there are generally two
recognized categories. 5 The first is dilution by blurring, which
involves a situation in which the use of a mark by a second user
blurs the consuming public's perception as to the source of
goods, which also causes erosion of the selling power of the
mark.' 6 The second is tarnishment, which involves a situation
wherein the trademark owner claims that a second user's use of
the owner's mark tarnishes or injures the reputation associated
with the owner's mark. 7 This often involves situations where

12. Id. at 825.
13. Trademarks have been used for over four hundred years to designate origin or
ownership of goods. Id. at 814.
14. See, e.g., Laurence Brahm, The Reality of Registering a Trademark in China, 77
TRADEMARK REP. 320 (1987) (listing Cannon, Jaguar, Mercedes Benz, and Apple
computers as companies with trademarks recognized worldwide).
15. 2J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 24.13, at 21215 (2d ed. 1984).
16. See Mennen Co. v. Gillette Co., 565 F. Supp. 648, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating
that dilution of marks comes by blurring product identity or tarnishing the public's
positive perception of mark), affd, 742 F.2d 1437 (2d Cir. 1984); McDonald's Corp. v.
Arche Technologies, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1557, 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (finding dilution of
McDonald's Golden Arches trademark).
17. Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205,
203 U.S.P.Q. 161, 164 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that use of cheerleader uniform in
offensive motion picture tarnished trademark); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1039, 231 U.S.P.Q. 850, 856 (N.D. Ga.
1986) (finding dilution where "Cabbage Patch Kids" were rudely depicted on game
cards as "Garbage Patch Kids"); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prod., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 135
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (determining whether tarnishment occurred when Pillsbury Dough Boy
was depicted in a sexually suggestive, manner); American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved
Laboratories Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 2006, 2012 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (determining whether
tarnishment or confusion occurred when replicas of American Express cards were sold
as novelty items).
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a well known trademark may be used on an unsavory product.",
Minnesota is a recent addition to a large number of states,
starting with Massachusetts in 1947, which have passed antidilution statutes.1 9 New York's anti-dilution statute has been
the subject of a significant amount of the nation's dilution litigation.2" Since Minnesota's dilution statute was modeled very
closely to New York's, the Second Circuit's interpretation of
dilution will be reviewed. 2'
III.
A.

CASE LAW

Second Circuit Case Law

The Second Circuit, in an opinion addressing both trademark infringement and dilution, indicated that anti-dilution
statutes protect only strong marks, which are those marks having
a distinctive quality or having secondary meaning. In Allied
Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades,22 the court cited

18. LL Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishing, 625 F. Supp. 1531, 1538 (D. Me. 1986)
(determining whether dilution occurred when popular outdoor wear catalogue was
parodied by purveyor of marital aids), rev'd, 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
19. Presently, there are 28 states which have adopted anti-dilution statutes. These
states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1993); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-113
(Michie 1991); California, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West Supp. 1995);
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11 i(c) (West Supp. 1994); Delaware, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1993); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 1988);
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b) (1994); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 48-512 (1977);
Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 140, para. 22 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 548.11(2) (West 1987); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:223.1 (West 1987); Maine,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1980); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. Il0B, § 12 (West 1990); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 325D.165 (1994); Missouri, Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (Vernon 1990); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1993);
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-122 (1987); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 350-A:12 (1984); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-10 (1987); NewYork, N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1984); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (1988);
Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, § 1124 (Supp. 1992); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 6-2-12 (1992); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (Supp. 1992); Texas,
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West Supp. 1995) and Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.77 (West 1989).
20. The New York Statute reads as follows:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases
of infringement of a mark registered or not registered or in the cases of unfair
competition, notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties
or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services.
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAw § 368-d (McKinney 1984).
21. Compare MINN. STAT. § 325D.165 with N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 368-d.
22. 368 N.E.2d 1162, 198 U.S.P.Q. 418, (N.Y. 1977).
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examples of diluting trade names such as "'Buick aspirin tablets,'
'Schlitz varnish,' 'Kodak pianos,' and 'Bulova gowns.'"2" The
court laid out factors which would assist one in determining
whether a trademark was famous.24 First, the trademark must
have a distinctive quality or have acquired secondary meaning.25
A trademark having distinctive quality is described as being
arbitrary, fanciful, or coined, which essentially disqualifies
suggestive or descriptive marks. 6 If the mark is not distinctive,
it must have acquired secondary meaning through exclusive use
and advertisement by one entity.
The "distinctive quality"
element is required under both the New York and Minnesota
statutes.18 This is one of the requirements that prevents
dilution protection for weak marks.29
The majority held the mark "ALLIED MAINTENANCE" was
not strong or famous enough to warrant dilution protection. °
In a sharp dissent, it was urged that although "ALLIED MAINTENANCE" is not famous to a wide group of people, it is famous
to those individuals who work in the industry that Allied
operates.3 Thus, the majority required a mark to exceed a
threshold of some type of national prominence before it could
be famous or strong.32 The dissent posed a lower threshold,
requiring only that the mark be famous in a particular industry
or channel of trade. 3

23. Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162,
1167, 198 U.S.P.Q. 418, 423 (N.Y. 1977).
24. Id. at 1165, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 422.
25. Id. The court found the mark ALLIED to be a weak trade name; rather than
being distinctive or arbitrary, it is descriptive or generic. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The court found at least 300 businesses using "ALLIED" and thus held that
it did not have secondary meaning. Id.
28. Id. at 1166, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 422. See also MINN. STAT. § 325D.165 (1994); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1984).
29. Alied Maintenance Corp., 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 422. The
Minnesota statute's additional requirement that the mark be "well known or famous"
explicitly excludes weak marks. This is an important distinction and creates a higher
threshold of mark strength than is present in most other states' anti-dilution statutes.
Compare MINN. STAT. § 325D.165 (1994) with N.Y. GEN. Bus. STAT. § 368-d (McKinney
1984); see also supra note 19.
30. Allied Maintenance Corp.. 369 N.E.2d at 1166, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 422.
31. Id. at 1166-69, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 422-25.
32. Id. at 1166, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 422.
33. Id. at 1167-68, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 424.
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In Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc.,3 4 the court set out
factors relevant to a finding of dilution and also clarified the fact
that confusion is not a required element of dilution. The first
factor is the trademark must be "truly of distinctive quality" or it
must have "acquired secondary meaning in the mind of the
The court did not make a finding on the strength
public."35
of the SALLY GEE mark, since other dilution factors were lacking.3 6 However, the court did indicate that the mark was
virtually unknown.37 The second factor, likelihood of dilution,
was directed at the potential to blur or tarnish the original user's
mark, which would constitute a situation that would result in a
The court did not find this present in
likelihood to dilute.'
the facts, since the mark SALLY GEE was virtually unknown. 9
The final factor is the existence of predatory intent.' This is
a willfulness factor, which often may be hard to prove, but is
fairly easy to infer if a mark is famous.
In a recent Second Circuit case, Merriam-Webster claimed
that Random House infringed their trade book jacket cover and
violated the New York anti-dilution statute. *" The court found
there was a sufficient likelihood of confusion to support the
infringement claim.4 2 The court also found that Random
House's use of the phrase "Webster's Collegiate" did not violate
the anti-dilution statute because those two words had a "general
and prolonged" use by a number of publishers besides MerriamWebster.4 3 The court relied on the Sally Gee factors in stating

34. 699 F.2d 621; 217 U.S.P.Q. 658, (2d Cir. 1983).
35. Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625; 217 U.S.P.Q. 658, 661
(2d Cir. 1983).
36. Id. The Second Circuit referred to the Allied case for its holding that the
dilution statute only covers "extremely strong marks." Id.
37. Id. at 622, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 659-60.
38. Id. at 625, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 662. Thejunior user's SALLY LEE mark was shown
to be associated with higher quality clothes than the SALLY GEE mark, thus no
tarnishment was found. Further, no blurring occurred due to the fact that there was
no evidence that the senior SALLY GEE mark conjured up images of clothing to the
consuming public. Id. at 625-26, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 662.
39. Id.
40. Id. The court found that the defendant SALLY LEE was not aware of the
SALLY GEE mark or line of clothes. Id. at 623, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 660. Courts will find
a lack of predatory intent if the defendant is found to have acted in good faith. Id. at
626, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 662.
41. Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1994).
42. Id. at 74.
43. Id.
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that to succeed in a dilution claim the plaintiff must prove that
the mark is truly distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning." The court also referenced the factors identified in Mead
Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. 45 (discussed in

detail below). The holding regarding the dilution claim was the
result of the court's finding that the mark was not strong enough
to justify protection.46
In a case decided in 1993, Nikon, Inc. v. Ikon Corp.,47 the

Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a permanent injunction awarded to Nikon which prevented Ikon from using its
name as a trademark and forced them to recall all of their
outstanding products.' This case established that the anti-dilution statute applied to competitors as well as non-competitors. 49
The court also held that anti-dilution claims were not preempted by claims under the Lanham Act because each statute
protects different rights.5 '
There was no analysis of the
strength of the Nikon mark because the court said there was no
dispute about its strength and thus it deserved broad protection.5 1 The court also found there was a likelihood of confusion among relatively unsophisticated consumers, and a certain

44. Id. at 73 (citing Sally Gee, 699 F.2d at 621, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 658.)
45. 875 F.2d 1026, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (2d Cir. 1989).
46. Id. (reasoning that the mark was not actually used on the product in the form
the plaintiff was attempting to protect, it had not been so used "for decades," and was
merely a combination of generic words).
47. 987 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1993).
48. Nikon, Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 96-98 (2d Cir. 1993).
49. Id. at 96 (reasoning that the legislature could have made the absence of
competition a prerequisite to relief had it so desired).
50. Id. This is an important statement by the Second Circuit. There have been a
handful of articles written over the past years which question the constitutionality of
dilution statutes, based on preemption. See, e.g., Thomas J. Steuber, Antidilution
Demands Concentration,BENCH & BAR, Sept. 1994, at 23-26. Although the constitutionality discussion is beyond the scope of this article, the only judicial bodies at present to
recognize this minority opinion are two federal district courts in Iowa. SeeUnited States
Jaycees v. Commodities Magazine, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1360, 1366-68, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1119,
1124-26 (N.D. Iowa 1987); Comidas Exquisitos, Inc. v. Carlos McGee's Mexican Cafe,
Inc., 602 F. Supp. 191, 198-200, 225 U.S.P.Q. 426, 430-32 (S.D. Iowa 1985), af'd sub
no. Comidas Exquisitos, Inc. v. O'Malley & McGee's, Inc., 775 F.2d 260, 261-62, 227
U.S.P.Q. 811, 812-13 (8th Cir. 1985). This preemption concept has been rejected by
Congress, leading trademark practitioners, and the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156-57 (1989).
51. Nikon, 987 F.2d at 94 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818
F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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amount of bad faith on the part of the defendant.5"
In a more recent decision, Deere & Co. v. MTD Products,
Inc., 3 the court held that New York's anti-dilution statute was
violated because the defendant's use of an animated version of
the plaintiffs trademark in comparative advertising would
contribute unfavorable characteristics to the plaintiff's mark and
ultimately associate the mark with inferior goods and services.54
The court did not expressly state that the mark in question was
famous, but relied on the facts that plaintiff used the mark for
over one hundred years, plaintiff had federally registered several
versions of the mark, and the mark was widely recognizable as a
valuable business asset.5 5 These factors contributed to the
strength of the mark. 6 The court reasoned that the possibility
of a gradual "whittling away" or of any sort of use that may
"drain off" any potency of a mark is actionable under the
dilution statute 7
The Second Circuit dealt with an extremely famous mark in
American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Laboratories Corp.5" The
defendant marketed a condom package bearing the slogan
"don't leave home without it" and also used the name "American
Express" on the packaging. 9 American Express failed to convince the court that a likelihood of confusion existed, thus its
dilution claim was analyzed.'
The court adopted the same
strength analysis of the plaintiff's mark which is used for
trademark infringement analysis under the Lanham Act.6 '
Some of the factors reviewed by the court were: (i) the plaintiff
held federal registrations on the trademark, (ii) a considerable
amount of time and money was spent promoting the trademark,
and (iii) the trademark is readily recognizable to a large part of

52. Id. at 95-96.
53. 41 F.3d 39, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1936 (2d Cir. 1994).
54. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1936, 1940-41 (2d
Cir. 1994).
55. Id. at 42-45, 32 U.S.P.Q. at 1938-41.
56. Id at 42, 32 U.S.P.Q. at 1938.
57. Id. at 44, 32 U.S.P.Q. at 1939-40.
58. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 2006 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
59. American Express v. Vibra Approved Laboratories Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 2006,
2007 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
60. Id. at 2009-12 (holding no likelihood of confusion because of the eight relevant
factors, only the strength of the mark weighed in the plaintiff's favor).
61. Id.
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the general public.62 These elements were used to support the
finding that the mark was a strong mark and capable of protection under New York's antidilution statute.63
B. Mead Data v. Toyota: The Seminal Case to Date on Famous
4
MarksP

The issue before the court was whether Toyota's adoption
of the LEXUS mark for automobiles diluted Mead's LEXIS mark
for computer services.65 The district court ruled in favor of
Mead, finding Toyota's adoption of "LEXUS" diluted Mead's
"LEXIS" mark.66 However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
overturned the district court, finding that Mead's LEXIS mark
for computer services was not diluted by Toyota's adoption of
the LEXUS mark for automobiles.67 Upon an analysis of the
strength of Mead's LEXIS mark, the majority opined that the
LEXIS mark was not considered a coined mark and thus was not
entitled to the greater protection that a unique mark such as
KODAK would receive.' This was partially based on the fact
that LEXIS is a compound word, which has for its parts "LEX,"
which is latin for law and "IS," which is an acronym for information systems.69 How the consumer could possibly come up with
this explanation independently for the mark requires quite a
leap of faith.7" However, the court held that through extensive
sales and advertising Mead had made LEXIS a strong mark only
in the computer legal research field." The court also adopted
Mead's representation that seventy-six percent of attorneys
associate LEXIS with computerized services provided by Mead.7"
However, the critical underpinning of the court's decision was
that the "consuming public" which determines what constitutes
62. Id. at 2009, 2013.
63. Id. at 2014.
64. 875 F.2d 1026, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (2d Cir. 1989).
65. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1027, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961, 1962 (2d Cir. 1989).
66. Id. at 1028, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1963.
67. Id. at 1039-32, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1964-66.
68. Id. at 1031, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1965-66.
69. Id.
70. The majority also held that marks were pronounced differently, which again
is a questionable finding in this author's mind. Id. at 1029-30, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1964-65.
Pronunciation is a factor which has relevance to confusion, and not to dilution. Id.
71. Id. at 1028, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1963.
72. Id.
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"famous" should not be a subgroup of attorneys, but rather the
With this population, Mead's
general adult population.73
LEXIS mark is recognized by only one percent of those surveyed,
74
with half of this one percent being attorneys or accountants.
The appellate court therefore concluded that Mead's LEXIS
mark was strong only within its own market and not sufficiently
"famous" to the consuming public.7" This is consistent with the
Allied case, wherein the majority found76the mark at issue not to
be famous with the consuming public.
In a lengthy concurring opinion by Justice Sweet, he
disagreed with the majority's finding that LEXIS was a strong
mark only for a limited group. 7 Justice Sweet urged that
LEXIS is a strong mark, capable of dilution and further reasoned
the LEXIS mark had secondary meaning. 78 He was concerned
by the narrow reading of the majority, which he felt would only
afford protection to nationally famous marks, rather than
"strong" marks as required by the statute. 79 This is consistent
with the dissent in Allied."0 Thus both the majority and dissenting opinion in Allied and Mead were in disagreement over
whether a mark need only be strong or also needs to be famous.
C. The Eighth Circuit's Recognition of Dilution as a Remedy
The Eighth Circuit has also recognized trademark dilution
as a remedy. In Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co. 8 1 , Busch
sought to enjoin Stroh from using the phrase "LA" based on a
theories of infringement, trademark dilution (applying the
Missouri anti-dilution statute), and unfair competition under the
Lanham Act.8 2 A permanent injunction was granted, primarily

73. Id. at 1031, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1965.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1031-32, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1966.
76. See Allied Maintenance Corp., 369 N.E.2d at 1167-68, 198 U.S.P.Q.2d at 424.
77. Mead Data Central, 875 F.2d at 1032-34, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1966-68.
78. Id. at 1033, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1967.
79. Id. The New York statute only requires "strong" marks, not the added
requirement of "well known or famous" as included in Minnesota's dilution statute.
Compare N.Y. GEN. Bus. STAT. § 368-d (1984) with MINN. STAT. § 325D.165 (1994).
80. See Allied Maintenance Corp., 369 N.E.2d at 1167-68, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 424.
81. 750 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1984).
82. Anheuser Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631, 633-34 (8th Cir.
1984). Missouri's anti-dilution statute reads as follows:
(1) Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the
distinctive quality of a mark registered under sections 417.005 to 417.066, or
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applying Lanham Act protections. 8 3 However, in dicta the
court implied that a trademark owner's property interest is as
important as the public's interest in avoiding confusion. 4 The
court cited Frankfurter's discussion on the purpose of trademark
law in his dissent to Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 5 which essentially said that a trademark owner has
"something of value" in a mark which conveys to potential
customers "the desirability of the commodity upon which it
appears."86
Anheuser-Busch was involved in another Eighth Circuit case
in which it filed an action against Balducci Publications.8 7
Busch brought a trademark infringement and dilution action
based on Balducci's use of Busch's trademark in an advertising
parody.' 8 The lower court found for Balducci based solely on
the fact that there was no likelihood of confusion on the part of
the public.8 9 The court of appeals reversed, holding that there
was likelihood of confusion, the First Amendment did not
protect the parodist, and the parody violated the dilution
statute. 90 The court's decision rested on the application of the
Lanham Act, but stated that the anti-dilution statute may affect

a mark valid at common law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall be
a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition
between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or
services.
(2) Any owner of a mark registered under sections 417.005 to 417.066
may proceed by suit to enjoin the manufacture, use, display or sale of any
counterfeits or imitations thereof and any court of competentjurisdiction may
grant injunctions to restrain such manufacture, use, display, or sale as may be
by the said court deemed just and reasonable, and may require the defendants
to pay to such owner all profits derived from or damages suffered by reason
of such wrongful manufacture, use, display or sale; and such court may also
order that any such counterfeits or imitations in the possession or under the
control of any defendant in such case be delivered to an officer of the court,
or to the complainant, to be destroyed.
(3) The enumeration of any right or remedy herein shall not affect a
registrant's right to prosecute under any penal law of this state.
Mo. ANN. STAT. §417.061 (Vernon 1990).
83. Anheuser-Busch, 750 F.2d at 639-43.
84. Id. at 637-38.
85. 316 U.S. 203 (1942).
86. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 (1942).
87. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
88. Id. at 772. The trademark at issue was for "Michelob Dry" beer. The
defendant was using the trademark "Michelob Oily." Id.
89. Id. at 773.
90. Id. at 775-78.
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the relief available to a plaintiff.9" The discussion defined the
two forms of dilution, but focused on the "tarnishment" form.
The court was troubled by the likely fact that people who saw the
ad parody thought it implied Busch's product contained oil.92

As a result, the court said "tarnishment results from a negative,
although vague, statement about the quality of the product
represented by the trademark."9 3 The court did not get into

any discussion on the strength or the fame of the mark, apparently since the Missouri statute at issue focuses on the likelihood
of injury to business reputation by dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark.94
D. Congress' Actions on Dilution
In May 1988, with the cooperation and support of the
United States Trademark Association (USTA), Congress passed
a bill that would have created a federal dilution remedy.9 5 The
federal dilution provision proposed by the USTA would have

explicitly preempted the various state dilution statutes. 96 The

91. Id. at 776.
92. Id. at 777.
93. Id.
94. The Missouri statute does not explicitly require a "well known" or a "famous"
mark. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 412.061 (Vernon 1990).
95. The Federal Trademark Bill of 1988 was passed without dilution protection for
trademarks. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988).
96. The text of the USTA's proposed Federal Dilution Act reads as follows:
(1) The registrant of a famous mark registered under the Acts of 1881
or 1905 or on the principal register shall be entitled, subject to the principles
of equity, to an injunction against another's use in commerce of a mark,
commencing after the registrant's mark becomes famous, which causes
dilution of the distinctive quality of the registrant's mark, and to obtain such
other relief as is provided in this subsection. In determining whether a mark
is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as, but not limited
to:
a) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the
mark;
b) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods and services;
c) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of
the mark;
d) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the
mark is used;
e) the channels of trade for the goods or services with
which the registrant's mark is used;
f) the degree of recognition of the registrant's mark in its
and in the other's trading areas and channels of trade; and
g) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar
mark by third parties.
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proposed bill identified seven factors which the courts were to
utilize in determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous.97 The model bill also proposed that no confusion or
competition between the parties was necessary.98 This was
important since some courts have had difficulty in construing
dilution bills in the various states and have required the element
of confusion.9 9 The USTA's proposed dilution statute defines
"dilution" in the definition section in a very similar manner to
Minnesota's dilution statute. 1°
In assisting Congress with the model bill, the USTA
prepared a report and recommendations for The United States
Trademark System and Lanham Act in September 1987.11

The report accompanied the proposed legislation and contained
an extensive background regarding the proposed amendments
to the Lanham Act. °2 The report contained numerous recommendations to Congress regarding various provisions of the

(2) Remedies. The registrant shall be entitled to only injunctive relief
in an action brought under this subsection, unless the subsequent user willfully
intended to trade on the registrant's reputation or to cause dilution of the
registrant's mark. If such willful intent is proven, the registrant shall also be
entitled to the remedies set forth in Sections 35(a) and 36 [of the Lanham
Act], subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of equity.
(3) Federal Registration Defense in Dilution Actions. The ownership of
a valid registration under the Acts of 1881 or 1905 or on the principal register
shall be a complete bar to an action brought by another person, under the
common law or statute of a state, seeking to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of advertisement.
Section 45. Definitions.
Dilution. The term "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity of
registrant's mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the
presence or absence of (a) competition between the parties, or (b) likelihood
of confusion, mistake or deception.
THE UNITED STATES TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION TRADEMARK REVIEW COMM'N REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO USTA PRESIDENT AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS, reprinted in 77
TRADEMARK REP. 375, 458-59 (1987) [hereinafter USTA REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT].
97. Id.
98. Id. at 459.
99. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Allstate Driving School, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 4,
11-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that Sears failed to establish trademark infringement
because there was no confusion as to the origin of Allstate's service); Field Enter. Educ.
Corp. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 382, 388-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (holding that
de minimus confusion does not justify finding of trademark infringement).
100. The model bill defined dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of registrant's
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence
of (a) competition between the parties, or (b) likelihood of confusion, mistake or
deception." USTA REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 96, at 459.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 388-461.
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trademark bill.
The Commission indicated that "dilution
protection should be confined to marks which are both distinctive, as established by federal registration at a minimum, and
famous, as established by separate evidence."10 3 Of particular
importance to this article is a section which defines the "fame
factors" that are to be analyzed to determine whether a trademark falls within the dilution provisions. 104 The Commission
Report indicates that it has defined the factors to define a
famous mark, but no factor is controlling. 5 In general, the
Commission indicated that to be entitled to relief under the
dilution provisions, "a famous mark should be in substantially
exclusive use and be well known throughout a substantial
06
portion of the United States."'
The Commission identified the following fame factors:
1. The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of
the mark; °7
2. the duration and extent of use of the mark; 10 8
3. the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of
the mark;'0 9
4. the geographical fame of the mark must extend
throughout a substantial portion of the United
States;"10
5.
the degree to which the registered mark is famous to
purchasers in both the registrant's and the later user's
lines of commerce."' Dilution is possible with respect
to one purchaser's universe and not another;" 2

103. Id. at 459.
104. Id. at 460-62.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 459.
107. Id. at 460. A mark can either be inherent or acquire distinctiveness, but cannot
be inherently famous. The mark must acquire the status of being famous. Id.
108. Id.
109. 1&dTo the extent of advertising, the famous mark may have achieved such
stature over a long period of time, or may become famous overnight through
widespread publicity and advertising. Id.
110. Id. Parameters of how much of the United States is required should be left to
a case-by-case analysis depending on the type of goods and services and channels of
distribution. Id.
111. Id. at 460. A court may be more likely to grant protection where there is a
"reasonable probability that the later user adopted its mark with knowledge of the fame
of the registered mark." Id.
112. Id. at 461. Injunctive relief may be appropriate at the level at which the mark
is famous; e.g., if the mark is famous at an industrial level but not at a consumer level,
an injunction may issue at the industrial level but not at the consumer level. Id.
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the mark is or should be well known to a substantial
portion of the relevant purchasers of the goods or
services;"'
the registrant need not actually prove that the requisite
number of purchasers throughout a substantial portion
of the United States have knowledge of the4 registrant's
mark, if such knowledge can be inferred;"
third party uses of the same or similar marks are relevant to determining fame and distinctiveness of the
mark;" 5 and
dilution may be present in the presence or absence of
competition between the parties 6or the likelihood of
confusion, mistake or deception."

The factors identified above provide an excellent framework for
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding whether a mark is of
sufficient fame for dilution. The Commission indicated that
dilution is an extraordinary remedy, and thus the standard to
achieve a famous mark must be high." 7
Overall, the Senate favored the passage of the dilution
provisions in the trademark revision bill."' With regard to the
Senate's view on what types of marks the dilution provisions
protect, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary noted that the
dilution section protected "a narrow category of famous registered trademarks," and would "provide consistent national
protection for the tremendous value of famous marks.""' The
comments in the Senate Report indicated that the proposed
dilution cause of action would create "a highly selective federal
cause of action to protect federally registered marks that are
truly famous ... ."20 The Report highlighted the fact that the
dilution remedy should only apply to "a narrow category of

113. Id. The terms "majority" or "substantial majority" were left out because of the
lack of flexibility. Further, the term "appreciable number" of purchasers was also left
out due to the low threshold. The Commission felt that a higher standard should be
employed to gauge the fame of a trademark eligible for this extraordinary remedy. Id.
114. Id. The more channels of trade in which a registrant spreads their services, the
broader the scope of protection to the mark from dilution. Id.
115. If a mark is in widespread use, it may not be famous for the goods or services
of one business. Id.
116. Id. at 461.
117. Id. at 461-62; see also supra note 100.
118. S. REP. No. 515, 100 Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988).
119. Id. at 7.
120. See id. The Judiciary Committee further noted the examples of Kodak being
used on pianos, and Buick being used on aspirin. Id.
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federally registered trademarks."1 2 '
However, the House of Representatives did not pass the
dilution provision of the trademark revision bill.' 22 The House
Judiciary Committee indicated that serious questions were raised
by the dilution provisions with regard to first amendment
protected communications, and concern about chilling the
advertisements of goods and services to the public. 2 ' The
House capitulated to the concerns of these groups and others,
and the dilution provision was eventually dropped from the
House of Representative's final version of the trademark bill.'2 4
The above footnoted concerns were undoubtedly factors for the
eventual demise of the bill, but there were other factors which
generated some speculation.'2 5 On December 12, 1995, the
House of Representatives, in an attempt to enact a national
dilution statute, passed a bill which is very similar to the failed
bill of 1988.126

121. Id.
122. H.R. REP. NO. 1028, 100 Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988).
123. Id. Among the concerned groups identified were the Federal Trade
Commission, broadcasters, publishers of newspapers, books, magazines, the American
Civil Liberties Union, advertisers, insurance companies and practitioners. Id. Organizations such as the Society of Professional Journalists and National Public Radio were
concerned that the dilution provision would make satire and editorial acts illegal. Id.
at 5-6. During the hearings, Professor Ralph Brown of Yale Law School testified that
the dilution law would chill comparative advertising. Hearings on H.R 4156, the
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration ofJustice of the House Communicationson theJudiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
38 (1988) (statement of Ralph Brown, Yale University, School of Law).
124. H.R. REP. No. 1028, supra note 122, at 5.
125. Representative Howard Metzenbaum's (D. Ohio) son-in-law, Joel Hyatt, was a
defendant in the case of Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Services, 610 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Il1.
1985). Mr. Hyatt lost the ability to use a slogan for his chain of law firms when Hyatt
Hotel asserted the Illinois dilution statute. Id. at 386.
126. H.R. 1295, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The legislation reads as follows:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This act may be cited as the "Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995."
SECTION 2. REFERENCE TO THE TRADEMARK ACT OF 1946.
For purposes of this Act, the Act entitled "An Act to provide for the registration
and protection of trade-marks used in commerce, to carry out the provisions of certain
international conventions, and for other purposes," approved July 5, 1946 (15 U.S.C.
1051 and following), shall be referred to as the "Trademark Act of 1946."
SECTION 3. REMEDIES FOR DILUTION OF FAMOUS MARKS.
(a) REMEDIES. Section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1125) is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection.
(c)(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injuction against
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another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use
begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality
of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection. In
determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors
such as, but not limited to(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with
the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark
is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and
channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against
whom the injuction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by
third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark shall
be entitled only to injuctive relief unless the person against whom the injuction is
sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the
famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous mark shall also
be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 35(a) and 36, subject to the discretion
of the court and the principles of equity.
(3) The ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register shall be a complete
bar to an action against that person, with respect to that mark, that is brought by
another person under the common law or a statute of a State and that seeks to prevent
dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of advertisement.
(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing
goods or services of the owner of the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.-The heading for title VIII of the Trademark Act
of 1946 is amended by striking "AND FALSE DESCRIPTIONS" and inserting", FALSE
DESCRIPTIONS, AND DILUTION."
SECTION 4. DEFINITION.
Section 45 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1127) is amended by inserting
after the paragraph defining when a mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned" the
followingThe term "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties,
or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.
SECTION 5. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act.
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E.

The Legislative History of Minnesota's Trademark Dilution
Statute
The legislative history of Minnesota's Trademark Dilution
Statute is very brief. Initially, a bill (sponsored by Senator
Theodore A. Mondale (DFL) and Representative James Farrell
(DFL)) was proposed for the 1992 legislative session. The bill
passed the House Commerce Committee. However, due to a
heavy legislative agenda, the bill was never brought to a vote in
the necessary Senate Committee and never made it to the floor
during the 1992 session.
The bill was reintroduced in the 1994 legislative session,
sponsored by Senator Kevin Chandler (DFL) and Representative
Mark Asch (DFL). The bill underwent two amendments in the
Senate side, which are insightful to issues in this article. It was
proposed in the definition section under "distinctive quality,"
1 27
that the definition be amended to add "in its trade channel."
Thus the definition would read: "'distinctive quality,' means the
mark is inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness, and
28
the mark is well known or famous" in its trade channel.
In discussions between the author and Senator Chandler, it
was determined that this would lower the threshold of the "well
known or famous" standard and thus open the dilution provision
to too many marks. It could be relatively easy for a mark to be
well known or famous in its trade channel. Indeed, if one
carefully defines a trade channel, many marks would be well
known or famous. However, the owner of a mark in a relatively
narrow trade channel should not be able to employ the dilution
statute to enjoin the use of the same mark to a broad consuming
group. As an example, if a mark is used on an industry-leading
gene splicing instrument, it easily could be well known or
famous to genetic engineers, but unknown to others outside this
narrow group of people. Should this trademark be entitled to
dilution protection? The answer is a resounding "no," but under
the proposed amendment to the Senate bill, this scenario could
have been realized. The provision was dropped, and the
Minnesota bill requires the mark be well known or famous, with

127. MINN.
1 and 2).
128. Id.

STAT.

§ 325D.165 (1994) (defining statutory terminology in subsections
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no additional conditions which would lower the famous threshold. "29
' The bill was passed by both
the House and Senate and
°
signed into law in August 1994.1
IV. ANALYSIS
If the dilution statute was not limited to truly famous marks,
the statute could paralyze businesses confronted with selecting
new marks. Typically, a business will coin a trademark and
request a trademark practitioner to perform a trademark search.
In the majority of circumstances when conducting a trademark
search and preparing an opinion, a nearly identical trademark
will be found which is applied to a different class of goods. If
one's concern is only confusion, a business could thereafter
adopt this trademark with little fear of infringement because no
confusion could13result with different channels of trade, different
consumers, etc. 1
However, when the element of confusion is taken out of
play, the trademark's clearance search becomes much more
difficult for the trademark practitioner. During the trademark
search, when a mark which is identical or nearly identical is
discovered, the trademark practitioner must make a determination as to whether this mark is sufficiently famous or well known
to fall within the dilution provisions. If the practitioner determines that the trademark is sufficiently well known or famous,
and meets the other requirements of the Minnesota statute, the
party requesting the trademark search must proceed with caution
before utilizing the mark for fear of a trademark dilution action.
Thus, a critical issue confronting many trademark practitioners
under Minnesota's anti-dilution statute is assessing whether a
mark is well known or famous.
As discussed above, a major policy reason behind trademark
dilution is the prevention of the diminishment or whittling away

129. See MINN. STAT. § 325D.164(2) (1994).
130. Id. As of the date of this article, two published opinions have cited Minnesota's
dilution statute: Ventura v. Titan Spores, Inc., Nos. 94-3103, 94-3235, 1995 WL 530276
(8th Cir. Sept. 11, 1995) and DeRosierv.5931 Business Trus4 870 F. Supp. 941 (D. Minn.
1994). Ventura does not provide any insight into this article's topic. However, DeRosier
correctly noted the tradename at issue, "Michaels," was not distinctive and unique. Id.
at 948. It is unfortunate that courts have to deal with the dilution statute in cases where
it should not even be plead.
131. See supra note 3, and accompanying text regarding the Polaroid factors.
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of one's mark. Theoretically, a diminishment of a non-famous
mark could not occur, due to the lack of association to the nonfamous mark. Thus, the only way a trademark can be "whittled
away" is for a consumer confronted with the second user's
trademark, to make a mental association with the famous mark.
This mental association affects the particular consumer's
impression, in one way or another, of the famous mark. If this
mental association does not occur for a substantial number of
consumers, the policy objective behind the dilution statute is not
13 2

met.

The Minnesota statute clearly requires a mark to be
"famous."133 As discussed above, the term "in a particular
trade channel" was specifically deleted because of the concern
that a strong argument could be made that just about any mark
was famous in a particular trade channel. 3 4 Allowing this
language would have opened the dilution statute to many marks
which should not be protectable under dilution theory.
The factors set out in Allied, Mead, and by the United States
Trademark Association Commission are adopted by this author
as critical factors in determining whether a mark is sufficiently
famous to be rendered protectable under the Minnesota statute.13 5 These factors are critical in the determination of
whether a mark is well known or famous under the Minnesota
statute, and are as follows:
1. Geographical Fame
The mark must have widespread recognition throughout the
general public in order for dilution to be theoretically possi' A trademark well known only within a very small geoble. "36
graphic region, would, by definition, affect only a small group of
consumers. This type of mark should not be covered by Minnesota's anti-dilution statute.

132. See supra note 10.
133. See MINN. STAT. § 325D.165(2) (1994) (stating "distinctive quality means the
mark is inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness, and the mark is well
known, or famous").
134. See supra text accompanying note 127.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29; see also supra part III. B; supra note 96
(USTA).
136. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. 875 F.2d 1026,
1031-32, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (2d Cir. 1989) (referring to the fact that just because a
mark has selling power in a limited geographical and commercial area does not endow
it with a secondary meaning to the public in general).
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2.

The Degree of Overlap of the Consuming Group and the
Famous Group
There are two groups of individuals who are important in
the determination of a famous mark. The first group of
individuals are those that recognize the famous mark. The
second is comprised of individuals to whom the second user's
mark is directed. In order for dilution to occur, there must be
a substantial overlap of these two groups. In addition, the
famous group must account for a substantial portion of the
consuming group's population. For example, in the Mead case,
LEXIS information services was widely known among attorneys
and accountants who are part of the consuming group to which
Toyota directs its sales efforts for its luxury line of LEXUS automobiles.' . " However, the percentage make-up of the famous
recognition group (attorneys and accountants) was roughly one
percent of the Toyota consuming group.138 This small percentage resulted in an overall situation where a substantial portion
of the consuming group could not make the requisite mental
association with the first user's mark LEXIS and as a result, little
39
dilution would occur.
3. The Duration, Extent of Use, and Advertising of the Mark
There are essentially two ways for a mark to become famous.
The first way is extended use over many years, which accounts
for many marks' fame."4
The other method, as discussed
above, is a heavy advertising budget combined with an intense
media campaign. 14' However, more weight should be given to
the former method, because marks created overnight may also
be forgotten overnight. Thus, a long period of extended and
exclusive use is a favorable factor in the determination of fame.
4. The Intent of the Second User
Although actual intent need not be proven, the intent may
be inferred by the action of the second user. This typically
should not be a difficult factor to address if the mark is sufficiently famous. This constitutes the so-called smell test, and in
reviewing the case law for successful and unsuccessful dilution
claims, intent is generally apparent if the second user is attempt-

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 1078.
See supra text
See supra text
See supra text
See supra text
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ing to trade off the first user's reputation.
The above factors should all be considered; however, no
factor is controlling. The other elements of the statute such as
the mark possessing distinctive quality and likelihood of injury
or dilution all still need to be met to satisfy the statute. Thus a
complete analysis will require satisfying the following elements:
1) Likelihood of injury to a business reputation or of
dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark or trade
name;
2) the mark or trade name is inherently distinctive or has
acquired distinctiveness;
3) the mark or trade name is well known or famous.
V.

CONCLUSION

In summary, to fall within the provisions of Minnesota's antidilution statute, a mark must be well known or famous. This
threshold should be quite high, and should not be applied
without careful consideration of numerous factors. In Minnesota, there are a limited number of companies who have marks
which fall within the provisions of this statute. Minnesota's
businesses deserve to have the protection afforded to businesses
in other states, but the courts should be very careful when
granting injunctions under this extraordinary form of relief.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

23

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 2

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss4/2

24

